The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues — John Shaqi
The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and IssuesAsakawa, Kan'ichi
History
The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues
Asakawa, Kan'ichi
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 -- Causes
The _Tsūshō Isan_, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily
_Consular Reports_, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February
23, 1904.
Footnote 80:
See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for
January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859,
and 1870).
Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his
great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions,
and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight
rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one
mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing
exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have
caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents
per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American
flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially
if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr.
Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to
supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the
United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would
have to be developed. See the American _Review of Reviews_ for
February, 1904.
Footnote 81:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p.
11.
Footnote 82:
The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also
see _ibid._, April 4, 1903.
Footnote 83:
British Consul Hosie’s report, the _British Parliamentary Papers_
(“Blue Books”), _China, No. 1 (1900)_, p. 154.
Footnote 84:
See U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and
the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43.
Footnote 85:
The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 683–684.
Footnote 86:
For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business
only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the
_Tsūshō Isan_, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40),
1903.
At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coöperation of all
nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at
their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in
the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15,
1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the
customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as
rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its
trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to
conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian
commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading
nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at
the same time unable to develop it without either the coöperation of
other people or some unnatural devices.
Footnote 87:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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