presented by the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank, a British concern, in competition with the Russian proposals.[206] One of the terms of the British loan as matured between the Bank, Sir Claude, and the Marquess of Salisbury, was the opening of Talien-wan to foreign trade.[207] The British Minister’s intention obviously was, among other things, to forestall the possible Russian occupation of this port as well as Port Arthur.[208] The significance was well understood by the Tsung-li Yamên, which was, however, afraid to embroil China with Russia, for the latter’s _Chargé d’Affaires_ “had protested, under instructions from his Government, against its [Talien-wan’s] opening in the strongest manner, and had warned the Yamên that it would incur the hostility of Russia by doing so.”[209] The reason for this strenuous opposition was, on January 19, 1898, explained by the Russian Ambassador at London, who “urged very strongly that if we [the British Government] insisted on making Talien-wan an open port, we should be encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence, and denying her in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.” These remarks were significant in showing how foreign was the idea of the open door to the Russian policy in Manchuria. When Lord Salisbury asked the Ambassador, in the same interview, what possible objection he could have to making Talien-wan a free port if Russia had no designs on that territory, the latter replied “that without any such designs it was generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial _débouché_ upon the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain with respect to the commercial régime which was to prevail there.” Here is a clear indication that Russia had little faith in the compatibility of other nations’ commercial welfare in China with her own, or, in other words, in the ability of her people and the efficiency of their economic organization to compete with other nations in an open market. Else, she would not object to the opening of a port to the world’s trade. Lord Salisbury reminded the Russian Representative that “the most-favored-nation clause forbade China to give Russia at Talien-wan more favorable terms with regard to customs duties than she gave to other treaty Powers.”[210] England’s position, which was repeatedly shown to Russia, was that it was natural that Russia should open a port for her commerce on the coasts of the North Pacific,[211] but that it would be a contravention of the treaty rights[212] of other nations to make of the port an exclusive market for Russian trade. Under these persistent representations, Count Muravieff at last declared, on January 28, through M. de Staal, Ambassador at London, that any (_tout_)[213] commercial outlet secured by Russia “would be open to the