The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and IssuesAsakawa, Kan'ichi
History
The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues
Asakawa, Kan'ichi
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 -- Causes
ships of all the great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland.
It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose
trade interests are so important in those regions, would share in the
advantage.”[214] Then what was meant by “open”? M. de Staal stated on
February 10: “I cannot in any way anticipate the decisions of my
Government, which, in the event of acquiring an outlet in Chinese
waters, naturally remains free either to establish a _porto franco_ [i.
e., a port where goods imported are exempt from all import dues] there,
or to assimilate the port in question to the treaty ports of the Chinese
littoral.”[215] It will be seen later that, through the Imperial Order
of July 30 (August 11), 1899,[216] Russia declared Dalny a “free port”
in the sense of a _porto franco_, under certain conditions. In the face
of these elastic conditions, one would be slow, in spite of the Order,
to admit that the question stated by M. de Staal in the quoted passage
has been definitively settled by his government one way or the other, or
in a third alternative.[217]
Up to this point, namely, about February 10, 1898, one can follow the
gradual withdrawal of Lord Salisbury’s position. He at first seemed to
have accepted Sir Claude MacDonald’s suggestion to insist upon the
opening of Talien-wan as a condition of the British-Chinese loan, but,
evidently at the Russian opposition, presently contented himself with
giving the following instruction to the British Minister at Peking: “You
are not bound to insist on making Talien-wan a treaty port if you think
it impracticable, though we give it up with regret. Would it be possible
to obtain a promise of such a concession if ever a railway was made to
that port? You should maintain demand for opening of other ports.”[218]
Then, when the Chinese Government was so pressed by the opposition of
Russia and France as to declare on January 30 that unless England
pledged herself to offer protection to China against Russia, she could
not consent to accept the loan,[219] Lord Salisbury’s policy receded
further than before. He now made representations to Russia not to
infringe the most-favored-nation treatment in Talien-wan, if she should
lease the port. It is needless to say that such a direct request to
Russia was tantamount, on the part of England, to abandoning the desire
of securing the opening of the port from China, which, save for Russian
threats, was willing to comply with the desire; and to acquiescing in
and even recognizing Russia’s right to lease the port, instead of
opening it as a treaty port. Under these circumstances, it was not
strange that the British Government was met by Russia with the ambiguous
phrase, “open port,” which, in spite of Lord Salisbury’s attempt[220] to
interpret it in the sense of a _porto franco_, was found, in M. de
Staal’s statement of February 10, already quoted, to be still more
uncertain than it appeared when it was first declared. Russia seemed to
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