Footnote 202: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 9, No. 231. Footnote 203: The statement made by Count Muravieff, on December 22, 1897, at his diplomatic reception, and reported by Mr. W. E. Goschen.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, pp. 12–13, No. 37. Footnote 204: See _Ibid._, Nos. 26, 43, 62. At the same time, M. Pavloff, the Russian _Chargé_ at Peking, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Kinder, British chief engineer of the Northern Railway.—_Ibid._, No. 38; cf. Nos. 111, 115, 117. Footnote 205: M. Pavloff’s own story to Sir Claude MacDonald, on March 17, 1898.—_China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 2. Footnote 206: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 26. Footnote 207: _Ibid._, Nos. 30, 32, 43, 46. Some of the other terms were: (1) the maritime and native customs, salt tax, and _likin_, as security; (2) a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tsze valley; (3) a guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yang-tsze valley to any other Power; (4) the opening of some other ports; (5) the pledge that so long as the British trade with China was larger than the trade of any other nation, the inspector-general of customs should always be an Englishman; (6) a freer internal navigation; etc. These terms seem to have been framed so as to protect British interests in China strictly within the scope of the most-favored-nation principle. The demand for the opening of Talien-wan and Nanning strongly prejudiced England against Russia and France, while the Burma-Yang-tsze Railway was unpleasing to France, and the non-alienation of the river valley was sometimes regarded by Russia as a counterpart of her own claims beyond the Great Wall. The whole story of the loan negotiation, as well as that of the Northern Railway extension loan, is highly interesting and important in the recent history of China, but we are here concerned with the bearing of the first loan on the development of the Manchurian question. Footnote 208: It is highly interesting to note that during the latter part of 1903, when Russian aggression in Manchuria and on the northern frontier of Korea was feared, the American and Japanese Governments, with the moral support of the British, made successful efforts to open Mukden, Tatung-kao, and An-tung to foreign trade. This proposition had met a strong Russian opposition, which also delayed, till after the outbreak of the present war, the opening of Wiju on the Korean border. Footnote 209: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 51, 57. Footnote 210: _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 59. Footnote 211: _Ibid._, Nos. 72, 76, 123, etc. Footnote 212: The most-favored-nation clause is referred to, which—sometimes in general and sometimes in specific terms, and sometimes reciprocal and conditional, but nearly always unilateral and unconditional—is inserted in the treaty of China with each Power. See Mayers, op. cit. Footnote 213: