But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Śruti? Certainly perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor can Śruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal]; under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." (_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the "possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their possessing intermediate magnitude.[237] (_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" (_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker]. (_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikánta_), since it is never found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor again is it precluded (_bádhita_ or _kálátyayopadishṭa_), for there is no superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be any such equally valid antagonist.