[Footnote 297: The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a _guṇa_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."] [Footnote 298: The _guṇa_ (or βελτἱστη ἕξις) of an organ is not properly a cause of _pramá_ but rather _doshábháva-bodhaka_.] [Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (_niśchitáprámáṇya_).] [Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.] [Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _prámáṇya_.] [Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).] [Footnote 303: I read _tat-práchuryam_ for _tatpráchurye_ in p. 134, line 7.] [Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)] [Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _śakti_; _siddhe_ means _ghaṭádau_.] [Footnote 306: These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, called _abhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ_, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidhá_ or "denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ_, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. In _gám ánaya_, _gám_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but _ánayanánvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with "bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, and _vice versâ_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."] CHAPTER XIII. THE PÁṆINI-DARŚANA.[307]