The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of ReligionClifford, William Kingdon
Philosophy
The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of Religion
Clifford, William Kingdon
Ethics
The Tribal Self.--In the metaphysical sense, the word 'self' is
taken to mean the conscious subject, das Ich, the whole stream of
feelings which make up a consciousness regarded as bound together by
association and memory. But, in the more common and more restricted
ethical sense, what we call self is a selected aggregate of feelings
and of objects related to them, which hangs together as a conception by
virtue of long and repeated association. My self does not include all
my feelings, because habitually separate off some of them, say they
do not properly belong to me, and treat them as my enemies. On the
other hand, it does in general include my body regarded as an object,
because of the feelings which occur simultaneously with events which
affect it. My foot is certainly part of myself, because I get hurt when
anybody treads on it. When we desire anything for its somewhat remote
consequences, it is not common for these to be represented to the mind
in the form of the actual feelings of pleasure which are ultimately to
flow from the satisfaction of the desire; instead of this, they are
replaced by a symbolic conception which represents the thing desired
as doing good to the complex abstraction self. This abstraction serves
thus to support and hold together those complex and remote motives
which make up by far the greater part of the life of the intelligent
races. When a thing is desired for no immediate pleasure that it
can bring, it is generally desired on account of a certain symbolic
substitute for pleasure, the feeling that this thing is suitable to
the self. And, as in many like cases, this feeling, which at first
derived its pleasurable nature from the faintly represented simple
pleasures of which it was a symbol, ceases after a time to recall
them and becomes a simple pleasure itself. In this way the self
becomes a sort of center about which our remoter motives revolve,
and to which they always have regard; in virtue of which, moreover,
they become immediate and simple, from having been complex and remote.
If we consider now the simpler races of mankind, we shall find not
only that immediate desires play a far larger part in their lives,
and so that the conception of self is less used and less developed,
but also that it is less definite and more wide. The savage is not
only hurt when anybody treads on his foot, but when anybody treads on
his tribe. He may lose his hut, and his wife, and his opportunities
of getting food. In this way the tribe becomes naturally included in
that conception of self which renders remote desires possible by making
them immediate. The actual pains or pleasures which come from the woe
or weal of the tribe, and which were the source of this conception,
drop out of consciousness and are remembered no more; the symbol which
has replaced them becomes a center and goal of immediate desires,
powerful enough in many cases to override the strongest suggestions
of individual pleasure or pain.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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