The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of ReligionClifford, William Kingdon
Philosophy
The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of Religion
Clifford, William Kingdon
Ethics
I know nothing about necessity; I only believe that nature is
practically uniform even in human action. I know nothing about
an infinitely distant past; I only know that I ought to base on
uniformity those inferences which are to guide my actions. But that
man is a free agent appears to me obvious, and that in the natural
sense of the words. We need ask for no better definition than Kant's:--
'Will is a kind of causality belonging to living agents, in so
far as they are rational; and freedom is such a property of that
causality as enables them to be efficient agents independently of
outside causes determining them; as, on the other hand, necessity
(Naturnothwendigkeit) is that property of all irrational beings which
consists in their being determined to activity by the influence of
outside causes.' ('Metaphysics of Ethics,' chap. iii.)
I believe that I am a free agent when my actions are independent of
the control of circumstances outside me; and it seems a misuse of
language to call me a free agent if my actions are determined by a
transcendental Ego who is independent of the circumstances inside
me--that is to say, of my character. The expression 'free will' has
unfortunately been imported into mental science from a theological
controversy rather different from the one we are now considering. It
is surely too much to expect that good and serviceable English words
should be sacrificed to a phantom.
In an admirable book, 'The Methods of Ethics,' Mr. Henry Sidgwick
has stated, with supreme fairness and impartiality, both sides
of this question. After setting forth the 'almost overwhelming
cumulative proof' of uniformity in human action, he says that it
seems 'more than balanced by a single argument on the other side:
the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate
volition.' 'No amount of experience of the sway of motives ever tends
to make me distrust my intuitive consciousness that in resolving,
after deliberation, I exercise free choice as to which of the motives
acting upon me shall prevail.'
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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