The lessons of the Crimean war, as regards the navy, were few, but of the gravest importance, and they have led to results of which we cannot yet determine the end. The war opened by a Russian attack on a Turkish squadron at Sinope, November 20th, 1853.(10) That determined the fact that a whole fleet might be annihilated in an hour or so by the use of large shells. No more necessity for grappling and close quarters; the iron age was full in view, and wooden walls had outlived their usefulness, and must perish. But the lesson had to be again impressed, and that upon a large English and French fleet. Yet, in fairness to our navy, it must be remembered that the Russians had spent every attention to rendering Sebastopol nearly impregnable on the sea-side, while a distinguished writer,(11) who was present throughout the siege, assures us that until the preceding spring they had been quite indifferent in regard to the strength of the fortifications on the land-side. And the presence of the allied fleets was the undeniable cause of one Russian fleet being sunk in the harbour of Sebastopol, while another dared not venture out, season after season, from behind stone fortresses in the shallow waters of Cronstadt.(12) A great naval authority thinks that, while England was, at the time, almost totally deficient in the class of vessels essential to attacking the fleets and fortifications of Russia, the fact that the former never dared “to accept the challenge of any British squadron, however small, is one the record of which we certainly may read without shame.” But of that period it would be more pleasant to write exultingly than apologetically. When the Allies had decided to commence the bombardment of Sebastopol, on October 17th, 1854, it was understood that the fleet should co-operate, and that the attack should be made by the line-of-battle ships in a semicircle. They were ready at one p.m. to commence the bombardment. Lyons brought the _Agamemnon_, followed by half a dozen other vessels, to within 700 yards of Fort Constantine, the others staying at the safer distances of 1,800 to 2,200 yards. The whole fleet opened with a tremendous roar of artillery, to which the Russians replied almost as heavily. Fort Constantine was several times silenced, and greatly damaged; but, on the other hand, the Russians managed to kill forty-seven and wound 234 men in the English fleet, and a slightly smaller number in the French. They had an unpleasant knack of firing red-hot shot in profusion, and of hitting the vessels even at the distance at which they lay. Several were set on fire, and two for a time had to retire from the action. These were practical shots at our wooden walls. This naval attack has been characterised as “even a greater failure than that by land”—meaning, of course, the first attack.