Philosophy and religion -- Study and teaching (Secondary) -- United States
They had probably heard, I said, of “art for art’s sake,” the cant of
those who believed mere form and expression to be the whole of art, and
left out of account the thing expressed. Virginia misunderstood me to
say: “Art for its own sake,” quite a different thing. So, thinking I
would agree with her, she quoted, with disapproval, an article by Kenyon
Cox, saying: “He who worked for gold sold himself, and he who worked for
fame was utterly lost.” I said I quite agreed with him; that unless one
worked first of all for the sake of expression, and the joy of it, he
was no artist.
“And, meanwhile, his wife and children might be starving,” she answered.
“It is praiseworthy,” I said, “to support one’s wife and children, but
it has nothing to do with art.”
I said a man might well use his expression to earn himself bread; that
it was necessary and natural, and had often even spurred a man on to
work, but that it could not be his first aim if he were an artist. We
spoke of Shakespeare, and of Goldsmith, and of their writing under the
stress of poverty. I pointed out how, nevertheless, these men wrote of
the things they loved and understood, and how the joy of work must have
been their first aim.
I spoke of play, and of art being like play; of the old saying: “Work
first, then play.”
Henry said that was meant for little children.
I told them how scientists tried to explain play by calling it a
preparation for work. Virginia liked that idea. I said that I thought
work a preparation for play, that play, interplay, the joy of creation,
was life itself. The children easily understood play in this sense of
the beloved work. Virginia said her work was all play. I reminded her
that she might have to work hard, but she would do it gladly for the
sake of that play. Marian said her school-work was almost always play.
Ruth said: “I think play and work are the same thing, and that we human
beings have made the distinction of words.”
Art cannot rightly have any object but whole representation, but
expression of the understanding of life. I said that whenever art tried
to be moral—which was rather the business of philosophy—it lost
thereby; that whenever one took sides for a thing, one took sides
against something else, and had lost the completeness and symmetry of
art.
Henry said he thought art ought to teach a lesson.
I answered: “Art ought to show us the whole of life, which is
beautiful.”
Virginia spoke of Dickens’ novels, and said she thought those were best
in which he wrote with an object, and against an abuse.
I answered her that they were best and also worst. They were best
because he described in them the life which he knew and loved. But the
parts of these very good novels which were directed against any people
or institutions were always bad, inartistic, incongruous. As an example
I quoted the dreary dissertations on Chancery in “Bleak House,” and
those who had read it immediately agreed with me.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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