In the case of many individuals, these experiences of objects in their absence are relatively rare and obscure, and in some cases, indeed, are so obscure as to lead the individual to deny the existence of such experiences. In still other cases the centrally excited sensations, the mental images, are experienced in their vivid and, apparently, immediately sensory form only under special conditions, as in dreams, hallucinations, drowsiness, or fatigue, or under the influence of special drugs. It has appeared from the study of mental images that, in so far as they are present, they are not equally reported in the different modes of sensation. Visual images in some cases, auditory images in other cases, and motor images in still others, have seemed to be so specially frequent, vivid, or easily aroused that at one time it was customary to classify individuals on the basis of their images as visuelles, audiles, motiles, and efforts have even been made to adapt a method of teaching to the presumed “imagery type” of the student. In the present connection our interest is only in inquiring whether and in what degree “images of taste” are present. _Mental Images of Taste_ Is there a “gustatory” or taste imagination as well as a visual or an auditory imagination? It should, of course, be borne in mind that tastes may be “thought of,” “referred to,” or “indicated” without there actually being taste qualities present in experience. Thus, I may refer to the “saltiness of the pork” and discuss it in detail without having in consciousness the sensory tang and quality of “salt.” The saltiness may be “represented” in my thinking in this case, not by a taste quality at all, but by the word which stands for such a quality, or even by a visual picture of a white granular substance, or an elongated strip of meat. Only if the immediate and unanalyzable experience of sensory “salt” is present is there evidence, in this case, of an “image of taste.” Obviously, we must mainly rely in such cases on the testimony of the observer, although there have been investigations made of a more objective sort, in which it is shown that the reported “images” are so similar in character to actual sense experiences that the observer, under appropriate conditions, cannot distinguish between the two. If we turn to the results of introspection or individual testimony, we find that if taste images exist at all they are at least reported as very much less frequent and vivid than are images from other senses. Thus, one observer, who in the course of two years’ observation of his own experience recorded 2,500 “images,” classified these as follows: