impossibility of giving spatial and temporal form to the lower sensations prevents the representation of nature by means of them, and that this is a sufficient reason for regarding them as inferior is anything but adequate. _Immediate Affective Value of Taste_ Perhaps the greatest surprise comes when we consider the immediate affective value of impressions from the different senses. Impressions of taste, smell, and contact bear with them or immediately provoke very definite and powerful feelings,—feelings of pleasantness and disagreeableness, excitement and calm, tension and relief. Still more complex emotions than these simple feelings are called up more easily and universally by impressions from these senses than in any other way. Their immediate pleasure tone and their associated emotions may be, and usually are, exceedingly rich and intense. The smell of new-mown hay, coffee, flowers, whiffs of the salt sea breeze, the odors of animals, foods, spices, and herbs move us to strong emotions. The stroking of fur, the cool of evening, the delicious languor of a sun bath—all these have high and immediate affective value that can hardly be exceeded by any emotions provoked by colors, forms, noises, and tones. In general, those senses that are closely connected with our personal and bodily welfare, as is the case with taste, provoke strong affective reactions and convey to us a strong sense of reality. Those senses which are much less intimately related to our immediate bodily welfare possess much weaker feeling tone and provoke much less emphatic emotional reactions. Disagreeable odors, tastes, and contacts are quite beyond our endurance, but few are the sights and sounds to which we cannot easily reconcile ourselves. Here, then, we have the interesting and perhaps unexpected fact that the sense impressions possess æsthetic value just to the degree that they fail to arouse in us definite and powerful feelings. The inverted arrangement on the basis of æsthetic value gives us precisely the order on the basis of immediate affective value. Santayana’s assertion that the small range and variety of pleasure-toned qualities among the lower senses explains their non-æsthetic character, in part, is seen to be not only inadequate, but even a perversion of the facts. Just in that degree to which sense impressions fail to produce in us immediate pleasures and aversions, fail to provoke us to instinctive emotions of joy and disgust, fail to stir in us moods of irritation and acquiescence,—in just that degree do they declare themselves to be adequate raw materials for the fine arts. If, as we are often told, the primary purpose of art is to please, this must be an entirely unexpected state of affairs, and the low position of taste in the æsthetic scale becomes quite unintelligible. _Development in the Individual and the Race_