"It is not the attribute of mercy, but the attribute of justice, which insists upon legal satisfaction, and opposes an obstacle to the salvation of a sinner. Setting aside, therefore, the divine justice, and taking into view merely the divine compassion, there does not appear to be any reason why God should not by an act of bare omnipotence deliver the sinner from suffering and make him happy. This conducts Anselm to that higher position from which the full-orbed nature and character of the Deity is beheld, and he proceeds to show that compassion cannot operate in an isolated and independent manner in the work of redemption, and that if anything is done for the recovery and weal of the transgressor, it cannot be at the expense of any necessary quality in the divine nature, through the mere exercise of an arbitrary volition, and unbridled omnipotence. "The leading positions, and the connection of ideals, in this exceedingly profound, clear, and logical tract of the eleventh century are as follows: "Beginning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines this as the withholding from God what is due to him from man. Sin is debt. But man owes to God the absolute and entire subjection of his will, at all times to the divine law and will. This is not given, and hence the guilt, or debt, of a man to Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not consist in simply beginning again to subject the will entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving satisfaction for the previous cessation in so doing. God has been robbed of his honor in the past, and it must be restored to him in some way, while at the same time the present and future honor due to him is being given. But how is man, who is still a sinner, and constantly sinning, to render this double satisfaction, viz.: satisfy the law in the future by perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring its whole penalty? It is impossible for him to render it; and yet this impossibility, argues Anselm, does not release him from his indebtedness or guilt, because this impossibility is the effect of a free act, and a free act must be held responsible for all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical maxim, that the cause is answerable for the effect. But now the question arises: Cannot the love and compassion of God abstracted from his justice come in at this point, and remit the sin of man without any satisfaction? This is impossible because it would be irregularity and injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in the person of transgressor, nor in that of a proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not subject to any law or regulations of any sort; it enjoys more liberty than righteousness itself, which would be a contradiction and a wrong. Furthermore, it would contradict the divine justice itself, if the creature would defraud the creator of that which is his due, without giving any satisfaction for the robbery. Since there is no attribute