The Shadow On The Dial, and Other Essays: 1909Bierce, Ambrose
Philosophy
The Shadow On The Dial, and Other Essays: 1909
Bierce, Ambrose
Essays
Most lawyers have made so profound a study of human nature as to think
that if they have shown a man to be of loose life with regard to women
they have shown him to be one that would tell needless lies to a jury--a
conviction unsupported by the familiar facts of life and character.
Different men have different vices, and addiction to one kind of
"upsetting sin" does not imply addiction to an unrelated kind. Doubtless
a rake is a liar in so far as is needful to concealment, but it does
not follow that he will commit perjury to save a horsethief from the
penitentiary or send a good man to the gallows. As to lying, generally,
he is not conspicuously worse than the mere lover, male or female; for
lovers have been liars from the beginning of time. They deceive when it
is necessary and when it is not. Schopenhauer says that it is because of
a sense of guilt--they contemplate the commission of a crime and, like
other criminals, cover their tracks. I am not prepared to say if that
is the true explanation, but to the fact to be explained I am ready to
testify with lifted arms. Yet no cross-examining attorney tries to break
the credibility of a witness by showing that he is in love.
An habitual liar, if disinterested, makes about as good a witness
as anybody. There is really no such thing as "the lust of lying:"
falsehoods are told for advantage--commonly a shadowy and illusory
advantage, but one distinctly enough had in mind. Discerning no
opportunity to promote his interest, tickle his vanity or feed a grudge,
the habitual liar will tell the truth. If lawyers would study human
nature with half the assiduity that they give to resolution of hairs
into their longitudinal elements they would be better fitted for service
of the devil than they have now the usefulness to be.
I have always asserted the right and expediency of cross-examining
attorneys in court with a view to testing their credibility. An
attorney's relation to the trial is closer and more important than that
of a witness. He has more to say and more opportunities to deceive
the jury, not only by naked lying, but by both _suppressio veri_ and
_suggestio falsi_. Why is it not important to ascertain his credibility;
and if an inquiry into his private life and public reputation will
assist, as himself avers, why should he not be put upon the grill and
compelled to sweat out the desired incrimination? I should think it
might give good results, for example, to compel him to answer a few
questions touching, not his private life, but his professional. Somewhat
like this:
"Did you ever defend a client, knowing him to be guilty?"
"What was your motive in doing so?"
"But in addition to your love of fair play had you not also the hope and
assurance of a fee?"
"In defending your guilty client did you declare your belief in his
innocence?"
"Yes, I understand, but necessary as it may have been (in that it helped
to defeat justice and earn your fee) was not your declaration a lie?"
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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