The Shadow On The Dial, and Other Essays: 1909Bierce, Ambrose
Philosophy
The Shadow On The Dial, and Other Essays: 1909
Bierce, Ambrose
Essays
Is it honorable for a lawyer to try to clear a man that he knows
deserves conviction? That is not the entire question by much. Is it
honorable to pretend to believe what you do not believe? Is it honorable
to lie? I submit that these questions are not answered affirmatively by
showing the disadvantage to the public and to civilization of a lawyer
refusing to serve a known offender. The popular interest, like any other
good cause, can be and commonly is, served by foul means. Justice itself
may be promoted by acts essentially unjust. In serving a sordid ambition
a powerful scoundrel may by acts in themselves wicked augment the
prosperity of a whole nation. I have not the right to deceive and lie in
order to advantage my fellowmen, any more than I have the right to steal
or murder to advantage them, nor have my fellowmen the power to grant me
that indulgence.
The question of a lawyer's right to clear a known criminal (with the
several questions involved) is not answered affirmatively by showing
that the law forbids him to decline a case for reasons personal to
himself--not even if we admit the statute's moral authority.
Preservation of conscience and character is a civic duty, as well as a
personal; one's fellow-men have a distinct interest in it. That, I
admit, is an argument rather in the manner of an attorney; clearly
enough the intent of this statute is to compel an attorney to cheat and
lie for any rascal that wants him to. In that sense it may be regarded
as a law softening the rigor of all laws; it does not mitigate
punishments, but mitigates the chance of incurring them. The infamy of
it lies in forbidding an attorney to be a gentleman. Like all laws it
falls something short of its intent: many attorneys, even some who
defend that law, are as honorable as is consistent with the practice of
deceit to serve crime.
It will not do to say that an attorney in defending a client is not
compelled to cheat and lie. What kind of defense could be made by any
one who did not profess belief in the innocence of his client?--did
not affirm it in the most serious and impressive way?--did not lie? How
would it profit the defense to be conducted by one who would not meet
the prosecution's grave asseverations of belief in the prisoner's guilt
by equally grave assurances of faith in his innocence? And in point
of fact, when was counsel for the defense ever known to forego the
advantage of that solemn falsehood? If I am asked what would become
of accused persons if they had to prove their innocence to the lawyers
before making a defense in court, I reply that I do not know; and in my
turn I ask: What would become of Humpty Dumpty if all the king's horses
and all the king's men were an isosceles triangle?
It all amounts to this, that lawyers want clients and are not particular
about the kind of clients that they get All this is very ugly work,
and a public interest that can not be served without it would better be
unserved.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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