Soliman had intended to put his army in motion in 1528, but his stores were destroyed, and his arrangements paralysed by rains of such extraordinary violence, that the troops, and even his own person, were endangered. A year’s respite was thus afforded to the Austrians,—the more valuable to them because, as all accounts concur in stating, they had in the first instance placed little reliance on the accounts of the Turkish preparations for war, and had entertained a very unreasonable disbelief in any serious intention on the part of Soliman to carry his menaces into execution. The threats and vaunting of Oriental despots may generally be received with much allowance for grandiloquence; but in this instance Ferdinand should have remembered that the sovereign who uttered them had already once overrun Hungary to the frontiers of Austria, and had good reason, from past experience, to anticipate success in a renewed invasion. On the 10th of April, 1529, the Sultan left Constantinople at the head of an army of at least 200,000 men. Zapolya, on his part, was not idle. He applied to nearly all the powers of Europe, not excepting even the Pope, Clement VII., whom he knew to be at this period on bad terms with the Emperor, urging them to support what he termed his just cause. These applications were unavailing; the Pope replied by excommunicating him, by exhorting the magnates of Hungary to the support of Ferdinand, and by urging the latter to draw the sword without delay in defence of Christendom.