The Silent Watchers: England's Navy during the Great War: What It Is, and What We Owe to It — John Shaqi
The Silent Watchers: England's Navy during the Great War: What It Is, and What We Owe to ItCopplestone, Bennet
History
The Silent Watchers: England's Navy during the Great War: What It Is, and What We Owe to It
Copplestone, Bennet
Great Britain. Royal Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
The second possible course, apparently less heroic but in its ultimate
results probably as completely destructive for the enemy as the first
course, would have been to bear south-west, hugging the shallows as
closely as might be possible, and to endeavour to break a way through
the Straits of Dover and the English Channel. From Heligoland to the
Straits is over 350 miles, and we should have known all about the German
dash long before they could have reached the Narrows. Those Narrow Seas
are like the neck of a bottle which would have been corked most
effectually by our serried masses of pre-Dreadnought battleships and
cruisers interspersed by swarming hundreds of submarines and destroyers
with their vicious torpedo stings. We can quite understand how the
Germans, who had read Sir Percy Scott’s observations of a month or two
before on the deadliness of submarines in narrow waters, liked a dash
for the Straits as little as they relished a battle with Jellicoe and
Beatty in the far north, more especially as their line of retreat would
have been cut off by the descent from their northern fastnesses of our
battle fleets. Not then, nor a week or two later when we were passing
our Expeditionary Force across the Channel, did the Germans attempt to
break through the Straits and cut us off from our Allies the French.
The third course was the one which the Germans in fact took. It was the
famous course of Brer Rabbit, to lie low and say nuffin’, and to wait
for happier times when perchance the raids of their own submarines, and
our losses from mines, might so far diminish our fighting strength as to
permit them to risk a Battle of the Giants with some little prospect of
success. And in adopting this waiting policy they did what we least
desired and what, therefore, was the safest for them and most
embarrassing for us. Never at any time did we attempt to prevent the
German battle fleets from coming out. We no more blockaded them than
Nelson a hundred years earlier blockaded the French at Toulin and Brest.
We maintained, as Nelson did, a perpetual unsleeping watch on the
enemy’s movements, but our desire always was the same as Nelson’s—to
let the enemy come out far enough to give us space and time within which
to compass his complete and final destruction.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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