Opening the text

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning Proclus

Philosophy

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning

Name: The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Author: Proclus

Proclus

Neoplatonism -- Early works to 1800; Plato -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- Early works to 1800

But of incorporeal natures, some are divisible about bodies, but
others are exempt from such a division about the last of things. Those
incorporeals, therefore, which are divisible about the bulks of bodies,
whether they subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the
number of things moved by another, but at the same time moving others.
For these, because they possess an incorporeal allotment, participate
of a motive power; but because they are divided about bodies, are
deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together
with their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these, they
are indigent of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign
seat, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where, therefore, shall
we obtain that which moves itself? For things extended into natures
possessing bulk and interval, or which are divided in these, and
subsist inseparably about them, must necessarily either be moved only,
or be motive through others. But it is necessary, as we have before
observed, that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is
perfectly established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes
its energies in itself, and not in things different from itself. There
is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies, both in the
heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bodies primarily
derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite to discover
what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates, and
considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to
alter-motive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion,
to which of the above mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of
things being moved from themselves? For all inanimate natures are alone
alter-motive, and whatever they suffer, they are adapted to suffer,
through a certain power externally moving and compelling. It remains,
therefore, that animated natures must possess this representation, and
that they are self-motive in a secondary degree, but that the soul
which is in them, primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and
that through a power derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies,
so likewise it extends to them from itself a representation of being
moved by themselves.

Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.