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The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning Proclus

Philosophy

The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning

Name: The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Author: Proclus

Proclus

Neoplatonism -- Early works to 1800; Plato -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- Early works to 1800

If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than
alter-motive natures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which
the image of self-motion is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond
bodies, and the motion of every body, will be the progeny of soul,
and of the motion it contains. Hence it is necessary that the whole
heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing various motions, and
being moved with these different motions, according to nature (for a
circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should have ruling
souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies, and which are
moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the power
of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which
dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it contains,
and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute
of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose,
with the cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to
reason, or after a contrary manner, which it is not lawful to assert.
But if indeed, this world and every thing in it which is disposed in
an orderly manner, and is moved equally and perpetually according to
nature, as is demonstrated, partly in the mathematical disciplines,
and partly in physical discussions, is suspended from an irrational
soul, which moving itself moves also other things, neither the order
of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded by one reason, nor the
position of bodies, nor any other of those things which are generated
according to nature, will have a stable cause, and which is able
to distribute every thing in an orderly manner, and according to an
invariable sameness of subsistence. For every thing irrational is
naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself,
and is indefinite and unadorned in its own nature. But to commit all
heaven to a thing of this kind, and a circulation revolving according
to reason, and with an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted,
either to the nature of things, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If
however, an intellectual soul, and which employs reason, governs all
things, and if every thing which is moved with a perpetual lation, is
governed by a soul of this kind, and there is no one of the wholes in
the universe destitute of soul (for no body is honorable if deprived
of such a power as this, as Theophrastus somewhere says) if this be
the case, whether does it possess this intellectual, perfect, and
beneficent power, according to participation, or according to essence?
For if, according to essence, it is necessary that every soul should be
of this kind, since each according to its own nature is self-motive.
But if, according to participation, there will be another intellect
subsisting in energy, more ancient than soul, which essentially
possesses intellection, and by its very being pre-assumes in itself the

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