the Southern Slavs, drive them to a desperate decision. The influence of European diplomacy was doubtless very helpful; still, the Serbian people displayed admirable restraint under constant provocation. Germany and Austria, who are able to corrupt the greater part of their own Press, and even many foreign newspapers, and can command a whole staff of political agitators, never relaxed their campaign of abuse and calumny against Serbia, and everywhere represented her as an incapable, barbarous, and dangerous State. In this they were only too successful. Unfortunately the condition of Serbian home politics has often been deplorable, and in addition to this the murder of the King and Queen in 1903 provided ample material for biassing public opinion in Europe. On the whole Europe endorsed these calumnies and refused to listen to the counter-protestations of Russia and other Slavs, because the testimony of barbarians and troglodytes was obviously valueless. Serbia was frequently reduced to desperate straits. She was really defending the cause of civilization by stemming the tide of Germanism in the East—she was _preparing_ a great world-work, and her reward was merely contempt or a pitying smile. Without Russia’s moral support she must have been swamped by Austria long ago. With the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1909 and the disgraceful circumstances that preceded it (which I shall touch upon in a later chapter), the mutual enmity between Austria and Serbia reached its height. War between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Russia and Serbia on the other, seemed imminent, and was only averted by the intervention of European diplomacy, especially by the efforts of Sir Edward Grey. In a declaration dated March 31st, 1909, Serbia acknowledged the annexation as an accomplished fact, and promised henceforth to conduct her policy in a neighbourly and friendly spirit towards Austria. This was the last act of self-abasement extorted from the unhappy country, but by no means the end of hostile agitations. On the contrary, these only became more virulent, because Austria considered the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina merely a prelude to the invasion of Serbia. Hence the necessity of representing Serbia as a menace to the peace of Europe, and especially to the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power. Serbia’s prestige declined still further. But suddenly a new contingency arose, and the _Balkan War_ of 1912 brought to light a series of glorious proofs of heroism, self-control, statesmanship, and military and national ability on the part of Serbia. The contempt of Europe was transformed into admiration, and Serbia suddenly found herself appreciated at her true value. This was a blow Austria could not forgive, and still less the fact that the criminal blunder of the second Balkan War, whereby she fondly hoped that Serbia would be crushed, proved unsuccessful. A strong and respected Serbia was a thorn in the flesh to Austria and a disquieting