The social contract & discoursesRousseau, Jean-Jacques
Philosophy
The social contract & discourses
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Economics; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Social contract
Luxury in clothes shows similar differences. In climates in which the
changes of season are prompt and violent, men have better and simpler
clothes; where they clothe themselves only for adornment, what is
striking is more thought of than what is useful; clothes themselves are
then a luxury. At Naples, you may see daily walking in the Pausilippeum
men in gold-embroidered upper garments and nothing else. It is the same
with buildings; magnificence is the sole consideration where there is
nothing to fear from the air. In Paris and London, you desire to be
lodged warmly and comfortably; in Madrid, you have superb salons, but
not a window that closes, and you go to bed in a mere hole.
In hot countries foods are much more substantial and succulent; and
the third difference cannot but have an influence on the second. Why
are so many vegetables eaten in Italy? Because there they are good,
nutritious and excellent in taste. In France, where they are nourished
only on water, they are far from nutritious and are thought nothing of
at table. They take up all the same no less ground, and cost at least
as much pains to cultivate. It is a proved fact that the wheat of
Barbary, in other respects inferior to that of France, yields much more
flour, and that the wheat of France in turn yields more than that of
northern countries; from which it may be inferred that a like gradation
in the same direction, from equator to pole, is found generally. But
is it not an obvious disadvantage for an equal product to contain less
nourishment?
To all these points may be added another, which at once depends on
and strengthens them. Hot countries need inhabitants less than cold
countries, and can support more of them. There is thus a double
surplus, which is all to the advantage of despotism. The greater the
territory occupied by a fixed number of inhabitants, the more difficult
revolt becomes, because rapid or secret concerted action is impossible,
and the government can easily unmask projects and cut communications;
but the more a numerous people is gathered together, the less can
the government usurp the Sovereign's place: the people's leaders can
deliberate as safely in their houses as the prince in council, and
the crowd gathers as rapidly in the squares as the prince's troops in
their quarters. The advantage of tyrannical government therefore lies
in acting at great distances. With the help of the rallying-points
it establishes, its strength, like that of the lever,[1] grows with
distance. The strength of the people, on the other hand, acts only when
concentrated: when spread abroad, it evaporates and is lost, like
powder scattered on the ground, which catches fire only grain by grain.
The least populous countries are thus the fittest for tyranny: fierce
animals reign only in deserts.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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