We have now covered the work of the Salvation Army social movement in its different branches. We have described the work, the extent and the management of each department. We have also considered the criticisms and objections to which each department is open, and we have attempted to estimate the value of each department to society. We have arrived at the conclusion that the work of the Industrial Department, leaving out the Industrial Colony, is a practical, deserving and successful effort to put unfortunate men once more on their feet, at no expense to the public, saving a slight embarrassment to those already engaged in the salvage and second hand business; that the Army lodging house is the best so far offered for the housing of the lower homeless class, although not entirely satisfactory; that the Slum Work is good, but limited in its scope, owing to the religious sentiment attached, and the mental inferiority of its workers; that the Rescue Work is about the best of its kind; and that good work is being done in other directions, such as the prison work, the employment bureaux and the children's work. On the other hand, we have found that the two Industrial Colonies and three Farm Colonies are not successful enough to warrant any additional expenditure on them or on any new colonies. This is due to the fact that the class most needing help in the cities is not the class to succeed on the land, and to the fact that men are more successful as pioneers on the land, when they are scattered and left to rely on themselves, having experienced farmers as neighbors, than when they are grouped closely together in one colony. Also there is nothing in favor of heavy expenditure for Christmas dinners, since the same amount of money can be put to better advantage in other ways. But, having reached these conclusions regarding the separate departments of the Army social work, what about the movement as a whole? The critics have advanced a good many objections against the Army. Some of these objections relating to special departments and not to the Army as a whole, we have already dealt with in our discussion of those separate departments. There remain six principal objections: 1. That the organization is narrow and not willing to cooperate with other organizations. 2. That the highly centralized military form of government is likely to lead to disastrous consequences. 3. That the Army, in its financial dealings, does not take the public sufficiently into its confidence. 4. That the Army collects funds, on the strength of its social work, and applies these funds to religious propaganda. 5. That there is a lack of accuracy in its reports of work accomplished. 6. That the Army, as an organization, has become more of an end in itself, than a means to an end.