The state of feeling between the peasantry and the soldiery might have serious consequences if the Abyssinian monarch undertook an important campaign outside his territory. “The great danger to an unpopular king attempting such an expedition would be, in the absence of the army, a rising of an oppressed peasantry, backed up by some European Power, to put down the military party. The arming of the peasantry and farmer class with modern weapons has not altogether been a blessing to the present ruler, and may end not only in his downfall, but in that of the barons as well.”[257] The fighting value of the Abyssinian army is by no means a _quantité négligeable_ in the politics of Eastern Africa, and it would be very easy to underrate it. Mr. Wylde, in his narrative of the battle of Adoua, has given a very complete account of the numbers, armament and temper of the Negus’s forces, and he does not agree with the estimate formed by Mansfield Parkyns of their personal valour.[258] He has also described the tactics which they customarily adopt in attacking, and has made some interesting observations on the employment of artillery, mounted infantry, and cavalry in the country.”[259] The limitations to the activity of the forces are chiefly determined by commissariat difficulties. “The Abyssinian hordes are the same as the locust, they live on what they can get from the surrounding country; and when they have devoured everything, they have to move on to another place where supplies are procurable. At the outside an Abyssinian who is not one of the regular soldiers can keep the field for a couple of months, and then he has to take one transport animal with him, with a boy or girl, generally the latter, to look after his riding animal and to cook his food. The regular troops are the same; they have to bring supplies with them, which they get from their leaders before they set out on the campaign; after these are finished, unless fresh supplies come forward, they have to live on the country.”[260] Probably the most recently published paper dealing with the Abyssinian army is the despatch, dated June 2, 1904, of Colonel Rochfort, C.B., R.A., included in the official account of the operations in Somaliland.[261] Colonel Rochfort accompanied the forces which his Majesty Menelek II., on the invitation of the British Government, sent in 1903, “to intercept the Mullah’s retreat, should he attempt to escape to the south or west.” As might be imagined from the nature of the document, it contains no descriptive account of the Abyssinian Expedition, and very little critical comment upon it. But the following particulars may serve to convey some idea of Abyssinian operations in the field at the present time. The strength of the force first employed was about five thousand men, nearly all of whom were mounted on mules. It left Harrar for its destination (the Webi Shebeli, near Hilowen) on February 18, 1903, under the command of Fituari Gabri.