III. Examples of the synthetic use of the reason. The fecundity of deductive reasoning. Novelties discovered by the purely deductive sciences. Reason and insight in their general relations 93 IV. The reason and the "religious paradox." The "paradox" as not peculiar to religion. Common sense as an appeal to standards which are in some sense superhuman. No human individual personally experiences or verifies what "human experience," in its conceived character as an integral whole, is supposed to confirm. The concepts {xii} of truth and error are dependent upon the concept of an appeal to an insight which no human individual ever possesses. This latter concept cannot be limited to the mere world of "common sense," but must be universalised. The whole real world as the object of an all-seeing comprehension of facts as they are. Otherwise our opinions about the world cannot even be false. Resulting synthetic insight of the reason. The world as the object present to the divine wisdom 102 IV THE WORLD AND THE WILL I. Historical relations of philosophical idealism. General bearing of this doctrine upon the religious interest, and upon the history of religion 120 II. Objections to our doctrine of the reason as having no value for life, and as failing to help toward solving the problem of salvation 129 III. First answer to these objections. Reports of religious experience that show some relations of our doctrine to the problem in question 131 IV. Relations of knowledge and will in general. Statement of the position of Pragmatism. Resulting objections to our whole doctrine of the reason. Truth as tested through "workings." Absolute truth as indefinable. Pragmatism as taught by James has defined its own forms and tests of religious insight. These forms and tests of insight are asserted to be superior to our own. Religious insight as saving, but as also empirical, in James's sense of that term, and as never absolute 135 {xiii} V. Answer to pragmatism. Our agreement with some of its principal positions. Our intelligence as the counsellor of our actions. The point where we are at issue with pragmatism. Reason and will, their general relations. Vindication of the position taken in the former lecture 144