The Southern Case for School SegregationKilpatrick, James Jackson
History
The Southern Case for School Segregation
Kilpatrick, James Jackson
African Americans -- Segregation; Segregation -- Southern States
This solid principle of constitutional law was in the court’s mind
that day in June 1953 when it asked for reargument in the School
Segregation Cases. What happened to the principle thereafter is sadly
apparent: The court tossed it summarily to one side. But briefly, at
least, the court recognized that in constitutional cases, clocks must
always be turned back.
The NAACP, on behalf of the Negro plaintiffs, did its dead-level
best to come up with some history to support its case. The story of
the plaintiffs’ exertions was confessed on December 28, 1961, by
Professor Alfred H. Kelly, of Wayne State University in Detroit,
in an address before the annual meeting of the American Historical
Association in Washington. Excerpts from his address were reprinted
in the _U. S. News & World Report_ of February 5, 1962. They provide
a fascinating, and a sobering, revelation of what Negrophile zeal can
do to an honest man.
“One day in early July, 1953,” Professor Kelly began, “I received a
letter from Mr. Thurgood Marshall.”
Marshall wanted Professor Kelly to prepare a research paper that
would support the NAACP’s answer to the first question posed by the
court. At stake was the venerable “separate but equal” rule, to which
Professor Kelly, as a person, was deeply opposed. Marshall explained
that the rule was crumbling and about to fall; but if the rule were
to be overthrown after all these years, “it would entail a piece of
judicial lawmaking which could be justified only by a philosophy
of extreme judicial activism--and this at the hands of a Court
wherein several expressed their disapproval of judicial activism
and lawmaking by Court-made fiat.” But if this revolution in the
legal status of the Negro were to be achieved, the attempt had to be
made--and Dr. Kelly was ready to help make it. After all, both the
lawyers and the scholars at work on the case agreed that the old rule
had to be disposed of--but how? Dr. Kelly paraphrased their dilemma:
We would like to dispose of the Plessy rule, for once and for
all....
But we are fearfully embarrassed by the apparent historical
absurdity of such an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
equally embarrassed by the obvious charge that the Court will be
“legislating” if it simply imposes a new meaning on the Amendment
without regard to historical intent.
How to escape from this embarrassment? Why, historians must produce
for the NAACP a plausible historical argument to justify the court
in pronouncing (a) that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment in
this regard was unclear, or (b) that the amendment really had been
intended, all along, to abolish school segregation, or at least to
sanction its abolition by judicial fiat.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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