In another place we find the same great orator plainly referring to the exercise of this right, as one of the greatest bulwarks of freedom; and inveighing against the constitution because it gives the Senators the _power_ (not the _right_) to disobey with impunity. He would have the legislature to possess the power to _recall_ in cases of disobedience. Look to his remarks at pages 252 and 253. He says, speaking of the project to barter away the navigation of the Mississippi to Spain, and the right of the United States to that navigation—“American interest was fully understood—New Jersey _called_ her delegates for having voted against this right. Delegates may be called and _instructed_ under the present system, but not by the new constitution. The measure of the Jersey delegates was averse to the interest of the state, and they were recalled for their conduct.” In this paragraph he did not mean to say that instructions would not be given, or ought not to be obligatory, but that bad men would have it in their _power_ to disobey without fear, _because_ they could not be _recalled_. This at least is the only construction which will make his language consistent with that previously quoted, and that which now follows, from the same speech and the same page. “At present you may appeal to the voice of the people, and send men to Congress _positively instructed_ to obey your direction. You can recall them if their system of policy be ruinous. But can you, in this government, recall your Senators? or can you _instruct_ them? YOU MAY INSTRUCT THEM, and offer your opinions; but if they think them improper, _they may_ disregard them.” Here he thinks it would be a breach of duty to disregard them, and he objects to leave the _power_ of disobedience in the hands of Senators, without the power to recall them, which he thinks made the control over them complete under the confederation, and would make it so under the constitution. But surely the power of subsequent punishment, or of providing against future mischief, from the hands of the same individual, does not create an antecedent duty either moral or official. The suggestion of punishment or prevention, implies the previous or possible violation of an existing duty. And the absence of a power to punish or prevent, cannot diminish the obligation of such duty, if admitted to exist. HENRY considered the force of instructions complete, by the mere power to recall, which certainly could not undo or invalidate the act done in violation of instructions; he therefore considered this recalling power necessary to make bad men perform the duty of obedience. He was satisfied with the articles of confederation, yet those articles do not mention a power to instruct, or a punishment for disobedience, any more than the present constitution. The subsequent power to punish by recall is the only difference. If we continue the same sentence, we shall find that