he has coupled disobedience with bribery, and complains equally of absence of power to punish either. “If they give away, or sacrifice your most valuable rights, can you _impeach_ or _punish_ them? If you should see the Spanish ambassador bribing one of your Senators with gold, can you punish him? Yes—you can _impeach_ him before the Senate. A majority of the Senate may be sharers in the bribe—will they pronounce him guilty who is in the same predicament with themselves? Where, then, is the security? I ask not this out of triumph, but anxiously to know if there be any real security.” It would seem from this that the old patriarch was not thoroughly convinced of the incorruptibility of Senators, and wished to provide some mode of punishment for their offences, from the high moral crime of disobedience, to the petit larceny business of taking a bribe—and he even supposed a majority of the Senate might be guilty of the latter offence! The views of this illustrious man, and zealous champion of freedom, are still further developed at page 283. He is there again expressing his fears that the transactions in the Houses of Congress will be kept secret, and clearly thinks there would be no danger, if our representatives were all good men and would obey instructions, except that of being overruled by a majority. “But it will be told that I am suspicious. I am answered to every question, that they will be _good men_. In England they see daily what is going on in Parliament. They will hear from their Parliament in one thirty-ninth part of the time that we will hear from Congress in this scattered country. Let it be proposed in England to lay a poll tax, or enter into any measure that will _injure one part and produce emoluments to another_; intelligence will fly quickly as the rays of light to the people. They will INSTRUCT their representatives to oppose it, _and_ will petition against it, _and_ get it prevented or redressed instantly. _Impeachment_ follows quickly a violation of _duty_. Will it be so here? You must _detect_ the offence and punish the _defaulter_. How will this be done when you know not the _offender_, even though he had a previous design to commit the _misdemeanor_? Your Parliament will consist of sixty-five. Your share will be ten out of the sixty-five. Will they not _take shelter_ by saying they were _in the minority_—that the men from New Hampshire and Kentucky _out-voted_ them? Thus will _responsibility_, that great pillar of free government, be taken away.” He thus thinks the clause of secrecy will be used as a shield to conceal the _offenders_ who violate instructions, or otherwise betray their constituents.