This power, like that of regulating the militia, was claimed and exercised by the State Legislatures before this Constitution, and is not taken away; therefore, by the reasoning of MR. MARSHALL, in whose presence this right was frequently asserted, it still exists, not _by implication_, but as an original power not given away. But JUDGE HOPKINSON pursues a reverse mode of reasoning, and thinks the right does not exist—first, because not expressly granted by the Constitution—and secondly, because no form of proceeding is prescribed by which a refractory Senator could be compelled to obey. We must answer to the first, that the power is not granted but reserved, and is always understood to exist where representation exists, unless expressly prohibited. For the second, we must say, that no human ingenuity could devise a mode of compelling a refractory Senator to obey, because he may keep his purpose concealed until he votes; and that a power of subsequent punishment has never been given to _constituents_ over their delegates in any representative government, and would be more objectionable and dangerous in this case than any other, on account of the peculiar relative situation of the two governments. The _power_ of disobedience, of giving bad votes, and voting from corruption instead of conviction, is in the hands of all representatives, without power of punishment in the hands of constituents—can it thence be inferred that they have the _right_ thus to act? The Constitution requires, for wise purposes, an indefinite and absolute power of attorney irrevocable for six years, and any form of punishment, to be effective, must interfere with this requisition. There are legal powers, which it would be a gross violation of moral duty to execute, and we must hope for some principles of virtue to actuate our Senators as well as other fiduciaries, without keeping their limbs always bound in cords, and their necks under the axe. There was no power to punish for this offence under the confederation. The power to recall was distinct from it, and though it might punish offences, could not create duties. Our instructions are private. The Senate has nothing to do with them. Our Senator may burn them. The Senate cannot punish him, and we could not, if he took a bribe. Suppose a legislator is always intoxicated, or spends his nights in riot, or gaming, and is thus rendered stupid and inefficient, or careless. This will be admitted to be a violation of duty, but his constituents cannot prevent it, or punish him. Constituents have no power even to compel attendance, nor can they recall for non-attendance, whether produced by wickedness or misfortune; and yet MR. JAY says—“All the States will have an equal influence in the Senate, _especially_ while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and _insist_ on their punctual attendance.” There is no such power given in the Constitution.