If they cannot instruct they cannot insist upon attendance. The word “_especially_” here shows that the writers of the Federalist did not consider the influence of the States and of their Senators as by any means synonimous, but looked to the former to control the latter, by appointing proper persons, or such as would obey. The Judge thinks this power cannot flow, from the circumstance of the Senators receiving their _appointment_ from the State Legislatures. He says, the President and Senate _appoint_ Judges—“but are they to obey them?” Surely not. The Judges do not, either in fact or in theory, _represent_ the President and Senate. Nor are they appointed to attend to their interests or _legislate_ for them. The power does not flow from the faculty of appointing, but from the relation of constituent and representative. The Judge is elected for the soundness of his judgment, his knowledge of law, and his nice powers of discrimination in deciding controversies between the parties before him. He is the agent of nobody, and represents only the justice of the country, which requires him to be free from any extraneous influence. The Senator is elected for the skill and ability and faithfulness with which he will _represent_ our interests and wishes. He is our attorney, not our judge. He is under our control, and we are not subject to his jurisdiction. Let us suppose with the Judge, the case of a number of attornies, with powers irrevocable for six years, and indefinite within certain limits—the acts of a majority of attornies to be binding on all the principals, but the power of choosing any individual as attorney left open to the principals. Could they not be instructed? Could not the principals require a valid bond and security to obey or resign? If the attornies could judge exclusively of the limitations, and could bind their principals, might they not be tyrants and absorb all the fortunes of their principals. If selected to attend to the foreign trade of a set of merchants, they might control their domestic trade and interfere in their household matters. What injustice is done to any principal when the same right is extended to all? Is there not reciprocity? Is the right not a necessary protection? If a minority instructs for bad purposes it is overruled; if a majority instructs, its will ought to prevail. The advocate of the opposite doctrine supposes a right of the co-principals in the will of the delegate in opposition to that of his master, to be violated by our doctrine. Is this a part of the bargain?—a legitimate advantage?—Is the association not for mutual advantage, but to enable the cunning man to overreach his copartner by the ignorance or treachery of his agent? What may be a gain to-day may be a source of ruin to-morrow. Unless this game of overreaching is played, where is the loss by instructions? They must be either out-voted, or accord with the will of a majority. Do not