In these reported debates, _Hamilton_ is represented to have said—that “it would be a _standing instruction_ of the larger States to increase the representation.” Observe, this is not applied to the _Senators_ only, but to the delegates or representatives of the States in {407} Congress, in both Houses, and has no reference to any right of instruction by the State Legislatures to their Senators; _that_ was not the subject of the debate; nor is it intimated _by whom_ or in what manner these standing instructions are to be given. The meaning of General Hamilton, I think, is obvious, and has no bearing on our question. The phrase, _standing instruction_, means that it is so clearly the interest of the larger States to increase their representation, that their delegates will always consider themselves to be bound, to be _instructed_ by that _interest_, by their duty to their States, to vote for such increase. They will so _stand instructed_, at all times and without any particular direction from their States; they will always take it for granted, that it is their duty to increase the representation. The very phrase distinguishes it from the case of _specific instructions_ made, from time to time, on particular measures as they shall arise for deliberation and decision in the national legislature. But General Hamilton, as quoted, proceeds to say—“The _people_ have it in their power to _instruct_ their representatives, and the State Legislatures which appoint their Senators may enjoin _it_ (that is the increase of the representation) also upon them.” I may here repeat that all this is true; but by no means reaches the point to which this right of instruction is now carried. The people may instruct, and the legislatures may enjoin, and both will always, doubtless, be attended to with a deep respect and a powerful influence; but if with all this respect and under this influence, the representative or the Senator cannot, in his honest and conscientious judgment, submit himself to them, does he violate his official duty, and is he bound to relinquish his office? This is the question, and no affirmative answer to it, or any thing that implies it, can be found in any of the writings or speeches of the gentleman alluded to; nor, as I believe, in any of the writings or speeches of any of the distinguished men at that time. The doctrine is of a later date; it is not coeval with the Constitution, nor with the men who formed it. Much reliance is placed, by the writer in the Enquirer, on the strict meaning of the word _enjoin_; it is thought to be peculiarly imperative. Conceding, for the argument, that this precise word was really used by the speaker, it is certain that in speaking, and even in writing, this word is not always used in the strict sense attributed to it. Cases of common parlance are familiar and of daily occurrence, in which it is used only to mean a strong, emphatic