In looking for a support for my opinions upon this subject, I was naturally led to open the volume of the “Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention,” published from the notes of Chief Justice Yates. In this volume we find also the information communicated, by _Luther Martin, Esq._ a delegate to the federal convention from the state of Maryland, to the legislature of Maryland, relative to the proceedings of the convention. This communication occupies about ninety pages of the book, and contains a string of resolutions, amounting to nineteen, reported to the convention by a committee of the whole house. The fourth of these resolutions proposed “That the members of the second branch of the legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures, to be of the age of thirty years at least, _to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independence_, namely, seven years,” &c. There is another provision in this resolution which shows an intention to make the senators equally independent of the several states and of the United States. It is that they are “to be ineligible to any office by a particular state—or under the authority of the United States—except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, _during the term of service_, and under the national government for the space of one year after its expiration.” Mr. Martin was a decided opponent to the adoption of the constitution; he was opposed to federal power—a friend of state power—and seeking every means by which he could restrain the first and strengthen and enlarge the latter. He especially feared the senate; but he never thought of this controlling right of instructions by which the states might direct the federal legislation at their will, and make their senators, in the language of Mr. Tyler, “mere automata to move only when they are bidden—and to sit in their places like statues, to record such edicts as may come to them.” Mr. Martin's objection to the construction of the second branch of the federal legislature is, that the senators are independent of the states appointing them. He objects that they are chosen for _six years_; that they are not paid by the respective states, but from the treasury of the United States; that they _are not liable to be recalled during the period for which they are chosen_. This very able and ingenious lawyer could not have made this objection if he had conceived the cunning device of making it the constitutional duty of a senator to resign his place at the will of the legislature of his state.—After stating these objections, Mr. Martin proceeds: “Thus, sir, for six years the senators are rendered _totally and absolutely independent of their states_, of whom they ought to be the representatives, without any bond or tie between them. _During that time_, they may join in measures ruinous and destructive to their states, even such as should totally annihilate the state