Mr. Madison says: “We are proceeding in the same manner that was done when the confederation was first {532} formed. Its original draft was excellent, but in its progress and completion it became so insufficient as to give rise to the present convention. By the vote already taken, _will not the temper_ of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the senate? Do we create a free government?” We see then that Mr. Madison was of opinion that the mere power of appointing the senators by the state legislatures, would give those legislatures so much influence in this branch of the federal legislature as to impair its necessary power and independence. He asks: “Do we create a free government?” What would he have said had he supposed that to this power of appointment, there was to be added as flowing from it, an imperative and constitutional right of instruction, under the penalty of a forfeiture of the place by disobedience? At another period of the debate, on the constitution of the senate, Mr. Madison says: “That great powers are to be given, there is no doubt; and that these powers may be abused, is equally true. It is probable that members may lose their attachments to the states that sent them; yet the first branch will control them in many of these abuses. But we are forming a body on whose wisdom we mean to rely, and their _permanency in office_ secures a proper field in which _they may exert their firmness and knowledge_. Democratic communities may be unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of the moment.” After showing the dangers that may arise from popular bodies without some wholesome check and control of another body, he says: “The senate, therefore, ought to be this body; and to answer these purposes, they ought to have _permanency and stability_.” On the debate on the question whether the senators should be paid from the national treasury or by the states, Mr. Wilson said: “The states may say, although I appoint you for six years, yet if you are against the state your table shall be unprovided. Is this the way you are to erect an independent government?” But the doctrine of instructions comes to the same end by a much shorter and more certain operation. _Obey or resign._ Men might be found who, to render a great service to their country, or from personal motives of inclination or ambition, would continue in their seats, although their compensation were withdrawn. But they have no such choice, when the action of the legislature comes upon them in the shape of instructions. On the same question, Mr. Madison said: “I do assert that a national senate, elected and paid by the people, will have no more efficiency than congress; _for the states will usurp the general government_.”