As a matter of fact, failures of brokerage houses are peculiarly abhorrent to every one concerned. In the Paris Bourse a broker must give security at $50,000, and his bankruptcy in all cases is considered a fraudulent one, rendering him liable to arrest. The French _Agents de Change_ enjoy an absolute government monopoly, and naturally in the circumstances they are held to the strictest accountability; but aside from that a tendency is plainly discernible nowadays in all large financial centres to demand of stockbrokers on the Exchange a rigid adherence to such business methods as will prevent bankruptcies of dealers to whom the public entrusts its money. The danger of the London fortnightly settlement system lies not in the deferred delivery of securities, but in the fortnightly settlement of “differences.” A London broker may be actually bankrupt, yet if he is desperate or unscrupulous, knowing that his differences will not have to be settled for a fortnight, he may plunge into speculative risks fraught with the utmost danger. If the market goes his way he is saved; if it goes against him, he is still no more than bankrupt. But in his fall, as a result of this dishonest venture, he may conceivably ruin many others, and a chain of disasters may follow his excesses. It should be said in this connection that London jobbers and brokers keep a sharp watch on each other; it is extraordinary how quickly the news gets about if this man or that is over-extended. Again, either broker or jobber may discriminate in his dealings, taking care to avoid those against whom there is a suspicion. Notwithstanding the points of merit in the New York system, at some time in the future when local Stock Exchange business has expanded to proportions approaching those of the London Exchange, modifications must be made. If banks and brokerage houses are given a week or ten days to settle transactions, everybody will have a tolerably clear idea of what money will be required, and lenders will be enabled to make provision. London passed through the 1907 panic, under this arrangement, with a maximum rate of 7 per cent., while we in New York would have been glad to pay 200 per cent., and this, despite our deplorable currency system, could not have occurred had there been ample time for the banks to make preparations. From these observations it may be suggested that perhaps the time will come when the governors of the New York Stock Exchange may find it necessary to put in force a combination of daily settlement of differences, such as we have at present, with a periodical delivery of stock such as they have in London. Transactions for cash need not be affected by this arrangement, nor would the public lose any of the protection it now enjoys. In any case, if such a plan resulted in minimizing those violent fluctuations in our call-money market which have so long afflicted us, it would prove a permanent blessing.