It has been suggested to us that there should be a requirement either by law or by rule of the Stock Exchange, that no one should sell any security without identifying it by a number or otherwise. Such a rule would cause great practical difficulties in the case of securities not present in New York at the time when the owner desires to sell them, and would increase the labor and cost of doing business. But even if this were not the effect, the plan contemplates a restriction upon short sales, which, for the reasons set forth above, seems to us undesirable. It is true that this identification plan exists in England as to sales of bank shares (Leeman act of 1867); but it has proved a dead letter. It has also been used in times of apprehended panic upon the French Bourse, but opinions in regard to its effect there are conflicting. While some contend that it has been useful in preventing panics, others affirm that it has been used simply for the purpose of protecting bankers who are loaded down with certain securities which they were trying to distribute, and who, through political influence, procured the adoption of the rule for their special benefit. MANIPULATION OF PRICES A subject to which we have devoted much time and thought is that of the manipulation of prices by large interests. This falls into two general classes: (1.) That which is resorted to for the purpose of making a market for issues of new securities. (2.) That which is designed to serve merely speculative purposes in the endeavor to make a profit as the result of fluctuations which have been planned in advance. The first kind of manipulation has certain advantages, and when not accompanied by “matched orders” is unobjectionable _per se_. It is essential to the organization and carrying through of important enterprises, such as large corporations, that the organizers should be able to raise the money necessary to complete them. This can be done only by the sale of securities. Large blocks of securities, such as are frequently issued by railroad and other companies, cannot be sold over the counter or directly to the ultimate investor, whose confidence in them can, as a rule, be only gradually established. They must therefore, if sold at all, be disposed of to some syndicate, who will in turn pass them on to middlemen or speculators, until, in the course of time, they find their way into the boxes of investors. But prudent investors are not likely to be induced to buy securities which are not regularly quoted on some exchange, and which they cannot sell, or on which they cannot borrow money at their pleasure. If the securities are really good and bids and offers bona fide, open to all sellers and buyers, the operation is harmless. It is merely a method of bringing new investments into public notice.