It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great injustice to take these statements for more than theoretical conclusions drawn from the principles to which they were pledged. The moral character of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is quite above suspicion. It seems, therefore, strange that they should have felt themselves compelled to admit in theory what strikes the natural feeling with horror. It cannot, however, be unconditionally accepted that the statements laid to their charge as they used them imply all that historians find in them. Far from it; of some of their statements it may be said not only that they do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral, but that they are directed against actions customarily allowed, the argument being, that between such actions and actions admittedly immoral there is no real difference. This remark applies, in particular, to Zeno’s language on unnatural vice. [785] It was not, therefore, in opposition to the older Stoics, or a denial of their maxim that love is permitted to a wise man, [786] for the younger Stoics to condemn most explicitly any and every form of unchastity, and, in particular, the worst form of all, unnatural vice. [787] In the same way, the language permitting marriage between those nearest of kin, when examined, is very much milder than it seems. [788] And Zeno’s proposition for a community of wives may be fairly laid to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the charitable excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit. [789] Taking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic propositions, there are enough of them to arouse extreme dislike, even if they could, without difficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of the system. A moral theory which draws such a sharp distinction between what is without and what is within, that it regards the latter as alone essential, the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches no value to anything except virtuous intention, and places the highest value in being independent of everything—such a moral theory must of necessity prove wanting, whenever the business of morality consists in using the senses as instruments for expressing the mind, and in raising natural impulses to the sphere of free will. If its prominent features allow less to the senses than naturally belongs to them, there is a danger that, in particular cases in which intentions are not so obvious, the moral importance of actions will often be ignored, and such actions treated as indifferent. [B. Social relations.]