The same observation will have to be made with regard to the positions
which the Stoics laid down in reference to social relations. Not that
it was their intention to detach man from his natural relation [(1)
Origin and use of society.] to other men. On the contrary, they hold
that the further man carries the work of moral improvement [(a) Origin
of social claims.] in himself, the stronger he will feel drawn to
society. But by the introduction of the idea of society, opposite
tendencies arise in their ethics—one towards individual independence,
the other in the direction of a well-ordered social life. The former
tendency is the earlier one, and continues to predominate throughout;
still, the latter was not surreptitiously introduced—nay, more, it was
the logical result of the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an
Epicurean must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism. In
attributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism
had declared man to be independent of anything external, and,
consequently, of his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches to
rational thought and intention, the freedom of the individual also
involves the recognition of the community, and brings with it the
requirement that everyone must subordinate his own wishes to the wishes
and needs of others. Rational conduct and thought can only then exist
when the conduct of the individual is in harmony with general law.
General law is the same for all rational beings. All rational beings
must therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to
the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole.
Man must not live for himself, but for society.
This connection between the individual and society is clearly set forth
by the Stoics. The desire for society, they hold, is immediately
involved in reason. By the aid of reason, man feels himself a part of a
whole, and, consequently, is bound to subordinate his private interests
to the interests of the whole. [790] As like always attracts like, this
remark holds true of everything endowed with reason, since the rational
soul is in all cases identical. From the consciousness of this unity,
the desire for society at once arises in individuals endowed with
reason. [791] They are all in the service of reason; there is,
therefore, for all, but one right course and one law, [792] and they
all contribute to the general welfare in obeying this law. The wise
man, as a Stoic expresses it, is never a private man. [793]
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