However self-sufficing the wise man may be, still Epicurus will not separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings. [1344] Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on a contract entered into for purposes of mutual security. [1345] Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent their suffering injustice. [1346] Law and justice are not, therefore, binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can never be free from fear of discovery and punishment. [1347] There is not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and nations—those, in fact, which are able and willing to enter into the social compact. And the particular applications of justice which constitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with circumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must pass for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient it is no longer binding. [1348] The wise man will therefore only enter into political life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own safety. Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm. He who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most foolishly. [1349] Since private individuals live as a rule much more quietly and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the Epicureans should be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness. [1350] Their watchword is Λάθε βιώσας. [1351] To them the golden mean seemed by far the most desirable lot in life. [1352] They only advise citizens to take part in public affairs when special circumstances render it necessary, [1353] or when an individual has such a restless nature that he cannot be content with the quiet of private life. [1354] Otherwise they are too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the masses to wish even to make the attempt. [1355] For the same reason they appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles one thing at least is known, that they did not consider it degrading for a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances