From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question, argues that mental imperturbability or ἀταραξία proceeds, which can alone conduct to true happiness. [1413] Men are disturbed by views and prejudices which mislead them into the efforts of passion. Only the Sceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard things with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire. [1414] He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one external condition is preferable to another. [1415] In reality only the tone of mind or virtue possesses value. [1416] Thus, by withdrawing within himself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy. [1417] Absolute inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will act on probabilities, and hence follow custom; [1418] but at the same time he will be conscious that such conduct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction. [1419] The province of uncertain opinion includes all positive judgments respecting good and evil. Only in this conditional form will Timon allow of goodness and divine goodness as standards of conduct. [1420] The real object of Scepticism is, therefore, a purely negative one—indifference. It cannot even be proved [1421] that Pyrrho’s School so far accommodated itself to life, as to make moderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and desires. In this direction the School seems to have done but little. CHAPTER XXIII. THE NEW ACADEMY. [A. Arcesilaus.] Plato’s School was the first to put Scepticism on a firm footing, and to cultivate it as a system. It has been already remarked that after the time of Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics. To this new tendency it consistently adhered, when, shortly after the beginning of the third century before Christ, [(1) Denial of knowledge.] it took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring theoretical knowledge, as it had hitherto done, it assumed towards knowledge an attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge. How far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is impossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself probable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the Academy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had been carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most distinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then working at Athens as a prolific writer. [1422] The whole tone and character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays everywhere the presence of Stoic influences. By the confidence of its assertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without its being necessary to seek an explanation by improbable conjectures as to the personal relations of Arcesilaus and Zeno. [1423]