[128] Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. Φαντασία is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as itself; φανταστὸν is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν, and therefore πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. Φαντασία is distinguished from φανταστικόν, because no φανταστὸν corresponds to φανταστικόν· it is διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον· and the object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Compare also Sext. Math. vii. 241: διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is called φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν. Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual perceptions, are called by Diog. 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, φαντασία means any kind of notion. [129] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτης (χάρτην as Galen, H. Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφήν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων. [130] Plut. Comm. Not. 47: φαντασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in Diog. vii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from what follows. [131] Sext. Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400. [132] Sext. vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον·—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, which was equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in Zeno’s definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχὴ in a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, which really comes to the same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence ἑτεροίωσις was limited to change in feeling (ἑτεροίωσις κατὰ πεῖσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already remarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the soul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50; Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Boëth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.