[133] Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to mean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of sensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are individual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only obtained by a process of abstraction. [134] Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμαι γένωντα τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν. [135] Diog. vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν, ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν ... νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν (transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia, quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu (experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas arise either κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by comparison, or actual combination, or analogy. [136] Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2. [137] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ’ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by memory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been careless in his extracts here) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ’ ἤδη δι’ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόναι, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. Diog. vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μέν εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.