[138] Plut. Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (the first seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ’ ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ... καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. Sen. Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus præsumtioni (πρόληψις) omnium hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri. Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and consensus gentium. [139] Diog. vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις of good and evil. In Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked, How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics reply, By means of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι. [140] Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam, adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit. Similarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit ... nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength has grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral perfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was produced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by ἀπόδειξις. See p. 80, 1. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 792: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη. [141] Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ (knowledge in a relative sense) ἕξιν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) κεῖσθαι. Diog. vii. 47: αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. (This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165, certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ. [142] See p. 80, 4.