[287] Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν ἐστιν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most general Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14—τοῦτο, δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—and by him said to express the views of several schools, expresses a narrower conception—the conception of efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential one. [288] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια, and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’ ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that, according to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De Fato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of αἴτιον δι’ ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ. See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p. 1056 distinguishes between αἴτια αὐτοτελὴς and προκαταρκτική. Alex. Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἑκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. Conf. Orelli ad locum. [289] Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulistis, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ ... Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δ’ ὃ ... Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως. [290] Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues: Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. See Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext. Math. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander. [291] According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.