directed to these subjects before the time of Chrysippus, although these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, whilst ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy. At a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics in every direction, and especial attention had been devoted to logic, the necessity for these sciences came to be generally recognised. More especially was this the case with regard to natural science, including ‘theology.’ All ethical enquiries must start, according to Chrysippus, with considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only by a study of nature, and a knowledge of what God is, can anything really satisfactory be stated touching good and evil, and all that is therewith connected. [98] Less obvious is the connection between logic and the ultimate aim of all philosophical enquiries. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the shell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden; [99] and is considered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the discovery of truth and the avoiding of error. [100] The value of logic in their eyes is, therefore, essentially due to its scientific method; its proper aim is the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following Aristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to the doctrine of the syllogism. [101] That the value attached to logic must have been considerable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus devoted to the subject; [102] hence, the Stoics would never allow, in dispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and not a part of philosophy. To later writers that stiff logical mode of description, regardless of all beauty of language, appeared to be a peculiarity of the Stoic school, [103] and hence that School was characteristically known as the School of the Reasoners. [104] Frequent instances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry argument and formal logic; [105] in Chrysippus this fondness degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of taste. [106] [C. Divisions of philosophy.]