atmospheric substance in the seeds of individual things, in which the
Stoics thought the generative power (σπέρμα) alone resides, [362] is in
itself the germ out of which the corresponding thing is produced by
virtue of an inherent law. [363] The inward form is the only permanent
element in things amid the perpetual change of materials. [364] It
constitutes the identity of the universe; and whereas matter is
constantly changing from one form to another, [365] the universal law
of the process alone continues unchangeably the same.
[(2) Arguments in favour of Providence.]
All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakeably to the conclusion,
not only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that
every part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws, that no
definite arguments would appear necessary to establish this point.
Nevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting objections to
their views [(a) Argument from the general convictions of mankind.] in
the fullest manner. [366] In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus
appealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the
names used to denote fate and destiny, [367] and to the language of
poetry. [368] [(b) Argument from the perfection of God.] Nor was it
difficult to show [369] that a divine government of the world followed
of necessity from the Stoic conception of the perfection of God.
Besides, in proving the existence of a God by the argument drawn from
the adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world
was at the same [(c) Argument from the theory of necessity.] time
proved. [370] Chrysippus also thought to defend his theory of necessity
in the same strictly logical manner. For must not every judgment be
either true or false? [371] And does not this apply to judgments which
refer to future events, as well as to others? Judgments, however,
referring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must
come to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm
is impossible; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must
follow of necessity from the causes which produce it. [372]
[(d) Argument from foreknowledge of God.]
The same process of reasoning, transferred from the outer world to the
inner world of mind, underlies the argument from the foreknowledge of
God. [373] If in the one case it is alleged that whatever is true,
before it comes to pass, is necessary, so in the other it is said to be
necessary, if it can be truly known before it comes to pass.
[(e) Argument from the existence of divination.]
To this argument may be added a further one to which the Stoics
attached great importance—the argument from the existence of
divination. [374] If it is impossible to know beforehand with certainty
what is accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.
[(3) The idea of Providence determined.]
[(a) Providence as necessity.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account