But the real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is expressed in the maxim, that nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under given circumstances, can happen differently from what has happened. [375] This were as impossible, according to the Stoics, as for something to come out of nothing; [376] were it possible, the unity of the world would be at an end, consisting, as it does, in the chain-like dependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of everything and of every change. [377] The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power which rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and unless one unchanging causal connection governed every thing. [(b) Providence directed immediately to the universe, indirectly to individuals.] Divine Providence, therefore, does not extend to individual things taken by themselves, but only to things in their relation to the whole. Everything being in every respect determined by this relation, and being consequently subject to the general order of the world, it follows that we may say that God cares not only for the universe, but for all individual members of the universe. [378] The converse of this may also be asserted with equal justice, viz. that God’s care is directed to the whole, and not to individuals, and that it extends to things great, but not to things small. [379] Directly it always extends to the whole, indirectly to individuals throughout the whole, in so far as they are therein contained, and their condition is determined by its condition. [380] The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely based on a view of the universe as a whole; individual things and persons can only come into consideration as dependent parts of this whole. [(c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity.] [(α) Statement of several difficulties.]