The other line of argument is followed not so much in individual expressions. But owing no doubt to the pre-eminently practical character of its treatment of things, the Stoic view of nature, like the Socratic, has ever an eye on the adaptation of means to ends in the world. As, on the one hand, this adaptation of means to ends is the most convincing proof of the existence of deity, so, on the other hand, by it, more than by anything else, the divine government of the world makes itself manifest. [408] Like Socrates, however, they took a very superficial view of the adaptation of means to ends, arguing that everything in the world was created for the benefit of some other thing—plants for the support of animals, animals for the support and the service of man, [409] the world for the benefit of Gods and men [410]—not unfrequently degenerating into the ridiculous and pedantic, in their endeavours to trace the special end for which each thing exists. [411] But, in asking the further question, For what purpose do Gods and men exist? they could not help being at length carried beyond the idea of a relative end to the idea of an end-in-itself. The end for which Gods and men exist is that of mutual society. [412] Or, expressing the same idea in language more philosophical, the end of man is the contemplation and imitation of the world; man has only importance as being a part of a whole; only this whole is perfect and an end-in-itself. [413] [(2) Moral theory of the world.] The greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of the world, the less were they able to avoid the difficult problem of reconciling the various forms of evil in the world. By the attention which, following the example of Plato, they gave to this question, they may be said to be the real creators of the moral theory of the world. [414] The character of this moral theory was already determined by their system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law of the whole, it met the charges preferred against the evil found in the world by the general maxim, that imperfection in details is necessary for the perfection of the whole. [415] This maxim, however, might be explained in several ways, according to the meaning assigned to the term necessary. If necessity is taken to be physical, the existence of evil is excused as being a natural necessity, from which not even deity could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the necessity is not a physical one, but one arising from the relation of means to ends, evil is justified as a condition or necessary means for bringing about good. Both views are combined in the three chief questions involved in the moral theory of the world: the existence of physical evil, the existence of moral evil, and the relation of outward circumstances to morality. [(a) Existence of physical evil.]