Least of all, can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue; [543] he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and the peculiar value of virtue; [544] he appeals to feelings, rather than to actions; [545] he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments of the lower animals. [546] Pleasure must never be the object of pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably involved in virtue. That it no doubt is. [547] It is true that there is always a peculiar satisfaction, and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of mind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of inward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone knows what true and lasting pleasure is. [548] But even the pleasure afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a natural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent value of virtue is impaired. [549] Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the highest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure and virtue are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be immoral, and moral conduct may go hand in hand with difficulties and pains. Pleasure is found among the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good; virtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable; pleasure is grovelling, effeminate, fleeting. Those who look upon pleasure as a good are its slaves; those in whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and hold it in check. [550] In no sense can pleasure be allowed to weigh in a question of morals; seeing it is not an end-in-itself, but only the result of an action; [551] not a good, but something absolutely indifferent. The only point on which the Stoics are not unanimous is, whether every pleasure is contrary to nature, [552] as the stern Cleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. [553] Virtue, on the other hand, needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all the conditions of happiness. [554] The reward of virtuous conduct, like the punishment of wickedness, consists only in the character of those actions, one being according to nature, the other contrary to nature. [555] And so unconditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue, [556] that the happiness which it affords is not increased by length of time. [557] Rational self-control is here recognised as the only good; thereby man makes himself independent of all external circumstances, absolutely free, and inwardly satisfied. [558] [(4) Negative character of happiness.]