The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in Stoicism—is thus more negative than positive. It consists in independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it. In mental disquietude—says Cicero, speaking as a Stoic—consists misery; in composure, happiness. How can he be deficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage preserves from care and fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire? [559] How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way dependent on fortune, but simply and solely on himself? [560] To be free from disquietude, says Seneca, is the peculiar privilege of the wise; [561] the advantage which is gained from philosophy is, that of living without fear, and rising superior to the troubles of life. [562] Far more emphatical than any isolated expressions is the support which this negative view of moral aims derives from the whole character of the Stoic ethics, the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise man sufficiently proving that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional assurance, and self-dependence, are the points on which these philosophers lay especial value. [(5) The highest good as law.] The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the world, to which the individual is subordinate, appears to man in the character of Law. Law being, however, the law of man’s own nature, the Good becomes the natural object of man’s desire, and meets his natural impulse. The conception of the Good as law was a view never unfamiliar to moral philosophy, but it was cultivated by the Stoics with peculiar zeal; [563] and forms one of the points on which Stoicism subsequently came into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the ethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered that the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all beings, [564] so they recognised in the moral demands of reason the positive and negative aspects of the Law of God. [565] Human law comes into existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises its claims on him. [566] Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands absolutely imperative on every rational being. [567] No man can feel himself to be a rational being without at the same time feeling himself pledged to be moral. [568] Obedience to this law is imposed upon man, not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The good is for him that which deserves to be pursued—the natural object of man’s will; on the other hand, evil is that against which his will revolts. [569] The former arouses his desire (ὁρμή), the latter his aversion (ἀφορμή): [570] and thus the demands of morality are called forth by the natural impulse of a reasonable being, and are, at the same time, also the object towards which that impulse is naturally directed. [571] [B. Emotions and virtue.] [(1) The emotions.] [(a) Their nature.]