He replied to the communications and recalled the officer who had brought the despatches. “Set off immediately, sir,” said the Emperor; “these despatches must be delivered with the utmost speed. General Lasalle must receive my orders by three o’clock. You understand?” “Sire, by half-past two the general shall have the orders of which I have the honour to be the bearer.” “Very well, sir, mount your horse--but stop!” he added, as the officer was about to make his exit. “Tell General Lasalle,” and a magnetic smile lit up the Emperor’s face for an instant, “that it will be agreeable to me that you should be the person selected to announce to me the success of these movements.” After the terrible fight at Eylau, which proved that the French arms were not invincible and added considerably to the prestige of the Russian army, Napoleon felt compelled to concentrate his forces still further. Although he was within an easy march of Königsberg, upon which Bennigsen had retreated, and had promised his soldiers before the action that “their fatigue will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose” at that city, he determined to try Fortune no further. He put down the sword of war and took up the pen of peace, writing a letter to the King of Prussia calculated to woo him from his allies. After the triumph of Jena Napoleon had asked half of Prussia as the price of peace, now he was willing to give back all the conquered territory east of the river Elbe, and at the same time to release Prussia from any future strife he might have with Russia. We have already noted that Frederick William III. possessed little strength of will, of which fact the Czar as well as Napoleon was fully aware. Alexander determined to make the alliance between Russia and Prussia still more binding, feeling confident that Eylau was the beginning of the end so far as the Corsican upstart was concerned. The diplomacy of Napoleon received a check, and a treaty between Russia and Prussia was arranged at Bartenstein in April 1807, which, while it provided for eventualities which might follow the defeat of Napoleon, had the more immediate effect of strengthening the wavering purpose of the Prussian monarch. CHAPTER XX Friedland and Tilsit (1807)