Secondly, from eighteen to thirty per cent. of its liabilities to the public would be invested in first class securities. Those of and guaranteed by the British Government are in great request for this purpose, as the Bank of England would not hesitate to advance against such investments should a company find itself compelled to meet a sudden drain upon its resources. Every prudent banker therefore takes care that a large proportion of these securities is included in his list, which would also contain Metropolitan and other Corporation Stocks, English Railway Debentures, Colonial Government Securities, and so on. A banker's list, in short, should be a so-called "gilt-edged" one. Thirdly, a banker lends a certain proportion of his deposits in the London money market. Some banks have eight per cent. there, some fourteen per cent., and others from fifteen to twenty per cent., though the larger and better managed companies generally employ from seven to fourteen per cent. therein. A certain amount of this "call money," however, represents money which has been lent to jobbers and brokers on the Stock Exchange for "carrying over" purposes at the various settlements, but by far the larger part of it is money which has been lent to the bill brokers and discount houses. In no sense can this asset in the balance sheets of the banks be looked upon as a reserve. It is money invested in the London short loan market--money lent to the bill brokers, who, in times of bad credit, might not be able to repay it on demand. Just at the very moment when bankers are most in need, this asset is the least available; therefore, it is about the worst possible form in which the reserve of a credit institution, owing large sums at call, can be invested. As a credit bank's debts are due at call and short notice, a true reserve can only consist of legal tender, and the till money, which is required in the ordinary course of business during normal times, certainly cannot be classed with that reserve. When considering what is a bank's real cash reserve, we ought to deduct from four to five per cent. from the ratio of cash in hand and with the Bank of England to liabilities, for a trader would not include the cash required from day to day in his business with any reserve he might accumulate against accidents. Reverting to investments, we might take Consols as an illustration of their liquidity. During normal times Consols can be sold for cash at any moment, but it is otherwise in a time of panic, when practically everybody wants either to sell them or to borrow upon them. The market is then disorganised, and people require either gold or large credits at their bankers--not securities. Hence, even Consols are unsaleable when a panic develops into a crisis.